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Abstract: I examine data from 1992 to 2015 to assess the Dodd-Frank Act’s impact on the 
performance of U.S. depository institutions, thrifts in particular. Ceteris paribus, the average 
FDIC-regulated institution experienced a decline in profitability as measured by pre-tax 
return on assets (ROA) following the Act’s passage, but the decline was concentrated among 
commercial banks. Small thrifts increased pre-tax profitability, after controlling for other 
factors including weak economic growth. Depository institution loan quality improved after 
Dodd-Frank, less so for small thrifts but more so for large thrifts. Efficiency ratios, which 
regulatory costs affect, increased, more for thrifts than banks.  
 
 
 
  
 INTRODUCTION  
 
Following the subprime mortgage crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a sweeping set of regulatory changes intended to 
make the financial system less prone to crashes and to protect consumers from fraudulent 
financial institutions. Among the many provisions in the law, which President Barack Obama 
signed on July 21, 2010, was a set of reforms to the regulation of thrifts (savings and loans 
and savings banks) and their holding companies. Most notable among those was the 
elimination of their primary federal regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), an 
agency within the U.S. Treasury Department.  
Many politicians, watchdog agencies and observers placed some of the blame for 
the subprime mortgage crisis on the OTS. Under OTS’s supervision, Countrywide Bank, 
IndyMac Bank, and Washington Mutual Bank all encountered distress related to subprime 
mortgages before either going into receivership or entering into acquisitions arranged by 
regulators. Critics argued that the OTS had become more like a consultant than a supervisor, 
a magnet for risky commercial banks that went “regulator shopping” when their actions fell 
afoul of other supervisory agencies. As an example, an investigation by the Treasury 
Department’s inspector general found that a senior OTS official allowed IndyMac to report 
in regulatory financial statements filed in March 2008 money that it received two months 
later -- in May 2008 (Applebaum and Nakashima, 2008a and 2008b; Treasury Department, 
2010a and 2010b). The Dodd-Frank Act transferred the OTS’s responsibilities to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), and the Federal Reserve. As the provider of deposit insurance to thrifts, the FDIC 
already performed some supervision of thrifts, but the OCC and the Fed historically regulated 
only commercial banks and bank holding companies. 
In addition to the elimination of their separate regulator, thrifts saw some 
advantages that their charters had previously held over commercial banks shrink or 
disappear. For example, before Dodd-Frank, federally-chartered thrifts enjoyed more 
flexible branching powers than commercial banks. They could establish new branches in any 
state, subject only to approval by the OTS. Banks, on the other hand, could open new 
branches only if the laws of the host state expressly permitted it – a distinction that was still 
important in a handful of states. Under Dodd-Frank, banks are allowed to open new branches 
with only the approval of their regulator (Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010; Comizio, Petrasic, and Lee, 2011). The Dodd-Frank Act also weakened what is 
known as “preemption” for federal thrifts and their subsidiaries. Previously, the OTS held 
exclusive authority to regulate lending, consumer protection, and other matters related to the 
operations of thrifts. Under Dodd-Frank, however, federal thrifts are subject to the same legal 
standard for preemption that applies to national banks, which are subject to state regulation 
whenever it does not directly conflict with federal regulation (Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010; Donelson and Zaring, 2011; Smith, 2012).  
Dodd-Frank did not alter the qualified thrift lender (QTL) test, which requires thrifts 
to hold at least 65 percent of their asset portfolios in “qualified thrift investments” such as 
housing loans, home-equity loans, small business loans, credit card loans, and mortgage-
backed securities. In fact, the act imposed additional restrictions on thrifts and their holding 
companies if they do not pass the test. Nor did Dodd-Frank change other rules on lending 
that apply to federal thrifts, including limits on commercial loans, non-residential property 
loans, and consumer loans. These restrictions make it more difficult for thrifts to pursue 
 diversified lending strategies that may reduce their risk or increase their profits (Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010; Comizio, Petrasic, and Lee, 2011). 
Some thrift managers and owners appear to be chafing under the regulatory regime 
that resulted from Dodd-Frank as well as the preceding years of regulation and deregulation. 
With the support of the American Bankers Association, which lobbies on behalf of much of 
the thrift industry, bipartisan legislation was introduced in Congress in March 2015 to allow 
institutions chartered under the Home Owners’ Loan Act (i.e. federal thrifts) to become 
“covered thrifts.” Under this proposal, federal thrifts could obtain the lending powers and 
compliance responsibilities of national banks without changing their charters, a costly 
process that requires an application and review by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC). The bill, introduced by Reps. Keith Rothfus (R-PA) and Jim Himes (D-
CT), would allow covered thrifts to switch back to thrift rules under a process to be 
determined by the OCC. The Comptroller of the Currency, Thomas Curry, supports this 
legislation (American Bankers Association, 2015). Rothfus and Himes’ bill, however, has 
not been voted upon by the House or Senate (United States Congress, 2015). 
The movement to further alter thrift regulation comes at the same time that many 
bankers are also calling for the repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act -- or at least many of its 
provisions. The act imposed restrictions on both commercial banks and thrifts, large and 
small. These restrictions apply to a range of activities from securities investments to 
mortgage lending. The American Bankers Association in public statements argues that the 
act hits small depository institutions particularly hard, because the total cost of meeting some 
of those requirements are similar for both small and large institutions (American Bankers 
Association, 2012). In a survey, community bank executives reported that after Dodd-Frank 
they both added staff to deal with regulatory compliance and devoted more of existing staff 
time to regulatory compliance (Peirce, Robinson, and Stratman, 2014). New, or de novo, 
banks generally start small, and after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the chartering of 
de novo depository institutions has nearly ground to a halt. Between 2011 and 2015, five new 
banks began reporting to the FDIC, which tracks all federally-insured banks. In the previous 
five year period, 465 new banks began reporting (FDIC, 2015). There is evidence, however, 
that at least some of this slowdown can be explained by FDIC policies separate from the 
Dodd-Frank Act and macroeconomic factors unrelated to regulation (McCord and Prescott, 
2014; Adams and Gramlich, 2014).  
In this paper I examine evidence from financial statements submitted to regulators 
by thrifts and banks over the past 25 years to assess whether the Dodd-Frank act is associated 
with a decline in performance for U.S. depository institutions as a group, and whether the act 
has disproportionately impacted thrifts specifically. Using fixed-effects regression analysis 
to control for other confounding factors, I find that the average U.S. depository institution 
has experienced a decrease pre-tax return on assets (ROA) during the period following the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s passage. The decline, however, appears to be limited to banks, as the 
regression thrifts results indicate that thrifts increased their pre-tax profitability if factors 
such as economic growth, market concentration, and portfolio composition are considered. 
My analysis finds an improvement in loan quality among depository institutions in the Dodd-
Frank era. The improvement is not as great for small and medium-sized thrifts, but the 
improvement is greater for large thrifts. This suggests that the OTS’s supervisory weaknesses 
were limited to large thrifts. Finally, depository institution efficiency ratios, which include 
regulatory as well as other costs, have increased ceteris paribus in the Dodd-Frank period. 
 The increase has been more dramatic for thrifts than for banks, indicating that their new 
regulation, while less effective in preventing bad loans, is more costly. 
 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE THRIFT INDUSTRY 
 
The number of regulated depository institutions – both commercial banks and thrifts – has 
declined dramatically in the last 25 years. This can be attributed in part to the relaxation of 
regulations that prevented interstate branching, which allowed consolidation that previously 
would have run afoul of such rules. Several indicators provide evidence that bank charters 
have become somewhat, though not dramatically, more desirable than thrift charters in that 
time period. As Table 1 shows, in 1992, 82.3% of regulated depository institutions were 
commercial banks, and the remaining 17.7% were thrifts. By 2015, those numbers had 
changed 86.9% and 13.1%, respectively. 
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the aggregate pre-tax ROA for thrifts and commercial banks from 
1992 through 2015. The figures provide an accurate picture of the industry as a whole but, 
unlike the regression estimates below, provide greater weight to the behavior of large 
institutions but also. I examine pre-tax ROA rather than post-tax ROA because tax laws 
introduce a number of complications that can affect a depository institution’s post-tax 
income but are independent of its operating performance. In general, commercial banks 
generated 1.25 to 1.50 cents more return per dollar of assets over the time period. The notable 
exception is the subprime mortgage crisis period (roughly 2006 to 2011), when pre-tax ROA 
for both types of institutions fell, but commercial bank pre-tax profits actually dipped below 
those of thrifts for a short time in 2008.  Following the crisis, banks regained their consistent 
profitability advantage. But since 2011 the margin between the two groups’ pre-tax ROA has 
been slightly less than it was before the crisis, averaging 1.59 percentage points from 
1992:Q4 through 2006:Q4 and 1.33 percentage points from 2011:Q1 through 2015:Q3.  
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
Although they have, on the whole, improved a bit relative banks in profitability 
since the passage of Dodd-Frank, thrifts have fallen behind in terms of one measure of risk: 
loans that are 90 or more days past due, also called non-performing loans (NPL). As Figure 
2 shows, the greater value for aggregate NPL has alternated between thrifts and banks several 
times since 1992, with thrifts on the whole reporting greater NPL as a fraction of total assets 
since 2012, after Dodd-Frank passed and after the OTS closed. And while it is difficult to 
measure changes in regulatory costs, one way to assess the impact of Dodd-Frank is to 
examine commercial bank and thrift efficiency ratios over time (Figure 3). The efficiency 
ratio measures overhead expenses (including regulatory compliance costs) as a proportion of 
operating revenues. It is calculated by dividing noninterest expense less amortization of 
intangible assets by the sum of net interest income and noninterest income. A lower 
efficiency ratio is desirable, because it indicates overhead costs are smaller relative to 
operating income. As Figure 3 shows, banks held a consistent advantage in the efficiency 
ratio from 2001 to 2011, but thrifts held the advantage for a short time after, and since 2013 
the two types of institutions have had remarkably similar efficiency ratios, near 62%. The 
 spike in thrifts’ aggregate efficiency ratio in early 2011 comes from Hudson City Savings 
Bank which, at the time, was one of the country’s largest thrifts. In the first quarter of 2011, 
Hudson City incurred $1.9 billion in pre-payment penalties, which are classified as non-
interest expense, to pay off long-term loans it had taken before the crisis when prevailing 
interest rates were much higher than they have been post-crisis (Hudson City Bancorp, 2011).  
 
[Figure 2 Here] 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act may not be the only explanation for the differences in the 
relative performance of thrifts and commercial banks from 2011 onward. In a study 
examining the decline in new commercial bank charters following the Dodd-Frank Act, 
Adams and Gramlich (2014) find that factors unrelated to regulation can explain 75-80% of 
that decline. Weak economic growth, which has prevailed throughout the post Dodd-Frank 
era, is typically associated with reduced demand for deposits and loans. In addition, a narrow 
spread between short-term and long-term interest rates discourages new banks, which do not 
have older, high-interest rate loans on their books, from entering the market. Other 
regulations that seek to reduce risk have restricted paths to greater profitability such as the 
increased capital and liquidity requirements imposed by the Basel agreements.   
 
[Figure 3 Here] 
 
THEORY AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
The figures discussed above indicate that U.S. depository institution profitability as a whole 
has not returned to pre-crisis levels. Given the increased regulatory burden that the Dodd-
Frank act appears to have placed on all such institutions, I test the hypothesis that, even after 
controlling for other factors, overall depository institution profitability declined during the 
Dodd-Frank era. And given the pre-tax ROA data presented above, I also test the hypothesis 
that, after controlling for other factors, the change in regulation associated with the Dodd-
Frank Act led to reduced profitability for thrifts more than it did for banks. The act eliminated 
some advantages thrift charters held over bank charters while restricting thrifts to lending 
strategies that might be more profitable than those allowed by the QTL tests. Thrifts may 
have surpassed banks in profitability due to better conditions in the sectors in which they 
typically specialize.  
I also hypothesize that the replacement of the primary federal thrift regulator, the 
OTS, and its replacement with other agencies led to stricter supervision that improved thrift 
loan quality. When thrifts came under the purview of the Fed, OCC, and FDIC, they became 
a small fraction of those agency’s regulated groups, rather than the only group supervised by 
the OTS. In addition, there is one fewer competing regulatory agency for institutions to 
choose from. Stigler (1971) theorizes that regulation is designed and operated mainly for the 
benefit of firms in regulated industries, and that regulators want to remain in existence. As a 
result, regulators cater to the most powerful factions in the industries they regulate. If this 
theory holds, as a small subset among a new larger set of regulated entities, thrifts’ ability to 
make higher-risk, higher-expected-return loans would be restricted by regulators more 
fearful of being caught allowing bad loans than losing an institution to a competitor.  
Finally, I hypothesize that after controlling for other confounding factors, U.S. 
depository institutions’ non-interest expenses, which include the costs of regulatory 
 compliance, increased after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Further, the advantages that 
thrifts enjoyed from a separate specialized regulator disappeared, which will lead to greater 
costs of regulatory compliance. To summarize, the hypotheses are: 
 
H1: All U.S. depository institutions became less profitable after the Dodd-Frank 
Act became law. 
H2: Thrift profitability declined more than commercial bank profitability after the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
H3: Loan quality for all U.S. depository institutions improved after the Dodd-Frank 
Act. 
H4: Thrift loan quality improved more than commercial bank loan quality after the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
H5: Efficiency worsened for all U.S. depository institutions increased after the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  
H6: Thrifts’ efficiency worsened more than that of commercial banks after the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  
 
The evidence presented on pre-tax ROA and NPL in the “Recent Trends” section 
indicates that thrifts became more profitable relative to banks while loan quality decreased 
relative to banks after the enactment of Dodd-Frank. The narrowing of differences in 
efficiency ratios during the Dodd-Frank era do not make it clear that the regulatory burden 
has become heavier for thrifts than banks. The figures above, however, present only a 
univariate analysis that does not control for other factors that differ among commercial banks 
and thrifts that could affect profitability, risk, and operating efficiency. I therefore developed 
regression models to test for differential effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on thrift profitability, 
risk, and efficiency while controlling for other factors that also affect those variables. The 
model for profitability is as follows:  
 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝑷𝑻𝑿𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑭𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑻𝑯𝑹𝑰𝑭𝑻𝒊𝒕×𝑫𝑭𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑻𝑯𝑹𝑰𝑭𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑵_𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+  ∑ 𝜷𝒋𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻_𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝟏𝟏
𝒋=𝟓
+ ∑ 𝜷𝒌𝑳𝑰𝑨𝑩_𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝟏𝟑
𝒌=𝟏𝟐
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔𝑴𝑼𝑻𝑼𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟕𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟖𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒎𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟗𝑪𝑶_𝑼𝑵𝑬𝑴𝑷𝒎𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝟎𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟐𝟏𝑹𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏×𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(1) 
 
ROAPTXit is institution i's pre-tax ROA in period t. Intercept terms do not appear in 
the models because I use fixed effects estimation (more on that below). The variables of 
interest are DFt, THRIFTit×DFt, and, to a lesser degree, THRIFTit. DFt is a binary variable 
equal to one in 2011-2015, the years in which depository institution profits should reflect the 
effects of the Dodd-Frank Act. A positive, significant coefficient will support H1. 
THRIFTit×DFt is an interaction of THRIFTit and DFt, equal to one if the institution i is a thrift 
and the period t is after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient on DF×THRIFTit will measure the differential effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on 
thrift profitability. Because my hypothesis, H2, is that the Dodd-Frank Act has 
disproportionately hindered thrifts, I expect the sign on the THRIFT×DFit coefficient to be 
negative. I also include the dummy variable THRIFTit, as a regressor to test whether outside 
 the Dodd-Frank time period depository institutions with thrift charters are more or less 
profitable than those with bank charters, after controlling for other factors. 
The model includes a set of control variables that previous authors (Berger et al. 
2007; Hannan and Prager, 2009, for example) have found to be associated with greater or 
lesser profitability for U.S. depository institutions.  These variables include a measure of the 
institution’s size (LN_SIZEit); a set of seven variables that measure the composition of 
institutions’ asset portfolios (ASSET_TYPEit-1); two variables measuring the composition of 
institutions’ liabilities (LIAB_TYPEit-1); variables representing asset quality (NPLit), 
efficiency (EFFit), corporate structure (MUTUALit), chartering authority (STATEit),  local 
market conditions (HHImt and CO_UNEMPmt), and two variables that account for the 
extraordinary circumstances of the subprime mortgage crisis, when there was a general 
liquidity crunch as well as a crash in the residential real estate market (CRISISit and 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1×𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡). To avoid endogeneity from bidirectional causality, I used lagged values 
of the asset and liability composition variables and RRE in the crisis interaction.  
I use the logarithm of real total assets (LN_SIZEit) because the sample distribution 
of total assets is skewed right, and its relationships with the dependent variables are likely to 
be non-linear, with the effect decreasing as size increases (diminishing returns to scale). I 
converted nominal values of total assets to real values using the consumer price index (CPI) 
for June of the corresponding years. Asset portfolio composition variables include the ratios 
of the following (nominal) variables to the institution’s (nominal) total assets: securities 
(SECURITIESit), total loans (LOANSit), commercial and industrial loans (CIit), consumer 
loans (CONSUMERit), commercial real estate loans (CREit), construction and land 
development loans (CLDit), and residential real estate loans (RREit). The composition of 
liabilities is measured by the brokered deposits-to-total assets ratio (BROKEREDit) and the 
non-core funding-to-total assets ratio (NONCOREit). Non-core funding is calculated as total 
liabilities minus insured deposits. The mix of assets has been found to be an important factor 
in bank profitability, but the quality of those assets is also important. To account for this, the 
model includes the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (NPLit). Differences in 
efficiency may affect profitability, independent of regulatory regime, so the efficiency ratio 
(EFFit) is included, too. Corporate structure is measured with a binary variable (MUTUALit) 
that equals one if the institution is under mutual (rather than stock) ownership. State 
regulation may be lighter than federal regulation and enable greater profit, so I include a 
dummy variable (STATEit) that equals one if the institution has a state charter and zero if it 
has a federal charter. To control for local economic influences, the model includes the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for deposits (HHImt) for the county m in which the bank has the 
greatest share of deposits. I expect bank profitability to be positively associated with local 
market concentration. The county unemployment rate (CO_UNEMPmt) proxies for local 
economic conditions. In markets that are struggling economically, the local unemployment 
rate should be higher and the institution’s profits lower. The binary variable CRISISt takes 
the value of one during the years of the subprime mortgage crisis (2007 through 2010). 
Finally, residential real estate lending may have been a profitable activity for institutions 
outside the crisis but, due to the general downturn in residential real estate, unprofitable 
during the crisis. The model therefore contains the interaction of the residential real estate 
lending to total assets ratio with the CRISISt variable (RRE×CRISISit). 
To test H3 (thrift loan quality improved after the Dodd-Frank act) I estimate with 
fixed effects regression a similar model to Equation (1), but use NPLit as the dependent 
variable. The set of independent variables is the same except that it excludes NPLit. I expect 
 the sign on DFit to be negative, under the assumption that regulation of depository 
institutions’ lending on the whole was stricter after the passage of Dodd-Frank quality, I 
expect the sign on DF×THRIFTit to be negative under H4, that thrifts have been more 
effectively regulated by the Fed, OCC, and FDIC than by the OTS. I also expect the sign on 
THRIFTit to be positive, consistent with lower thrift loan quality during the period when 
thrifts were under the supervision of the OTS. Equation 2 below presents the loan quality 
model. 
 
𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑭𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑻𝑯𝑹𝑰𝑭𝑻𝒊𝒕×𝑫𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑻𝑯𝑹𝑰𝑭𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑵_𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ ∑ 𝜷𝒋𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻_𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝟏𝟏
𝒋=𝟓
+ ∑ 𝜷𝒌𝑳𝑰𝑨𝑩_𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝟏𝟑
𝒌=𝟏𝟐
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓𝑴𝑼𝑻𝑼𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟕𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒎𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟖𝑪𝑶_𝑼𝑵𝑬𝑴𝑷𝒎𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟗𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟐𝟎𝑹𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏×𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(2) 
 
To test hypotheses H5 and H6, related to the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on non-
interest expenses, I regressed EFFit on the three variables of interest as well as most of the 
control variables in equation 2. Different assets and liabilities have different overhead costs. 
Local market concentration, ownership structure, and state supervision may all affect 
overhead costs, too. I exclude CO_UNEMP under the assumption that local economic 
conditions are not likely to have a net effect on depository institution efficiency.  
 
𝑬𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑭𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑻𝑯𝑹𝑰𝑭𝑻𝒊𝒕×𝑫𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑻𝑯𝑹𝑰𝑭𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑵_𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+  ∑ 𝜷𝒋𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻_𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝟏𝟏
𝒋=𝟓
+ ∑ 𝜷𝒌𝑳𝑰𝑨𝑩_𝑻𝒀𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝟏𝟑
𝒌=𝟏𝟐
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓𝑴𝑼𝑻𝑼𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟕𝑯𝑯𝑰𝒎𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟏𝟖𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟗𝑹𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏×𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(3) 
 
These models leave out some institution-specific variables that affect profitability 
such as management quality and expertise in niche lending markets or prevalence of fee-
based activities. To address this issue, I estimated the models using the fixed-effects 
approach, which operates under the implicit assumption that those omitted variables do not 
vary over time for individual institutions. Because diagnostic tests provide evidence of the 
presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, I calculate standard errors using the 
heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust approach proposed by Arellano (1987). 
Goodness-of-fit and model suitability measures are modified as described in Wooldridge 
(2002) to account for the fixed-effects approach. Based on correlations and variance inflation 
factors (VIFs), I concluded that near-collinearity did not significantly affect the standard 
error calculations for the variables of interest. In addition, as described in more detail below 
I estimated the models on several subsets of the data to assess the robustness of the results. 
In some cases, coefficients on a few control variables were not significant. In those cases, I 
dropped the variables and re-estimated the models. The qualitative results for the variables 
of interest remained the same, and the loss of variables did not result in improved adjusted 
R2 values. 
 
 DATA 
 
Data from the FDIC’s Web site were used to construct most of the variables in the regression 
model. The Statistics on Depository Institutions section provided the data on or the data used 
to calculate the pre-tax ROA, non-performing loan ratio, efficiency ratio, asset composition 
ratios, liability composition ratios, and total assets. The Summary of Deposits section 
provided data on institution type that allowed the classification of institutions as banks or 
thrifts. It also provided data on deposits and geographical location that enabled the 
calculation of HHIs. The FDIC releases Statistics on Depository Institutions data quarterly, 
but it releases Summary of Deposits data annually using data current as of June 30 of each 
year. I therefore used Statistics on Depository Institution data from the second quarter, which 
ends on June 30, of each year. CPI values are the 1982-84 chain-weighted base year CPI-U 
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, obtained from the St. Louis Fed’s Federal 
Reserve Economic Database (FRED) Web site. Finally, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Web site was the source of unemployment data, which are annual averages. Data were drawn 
for the years 1994 through 2015, a 22-year period. Because the regression model uses lagged 
values of many of the independent variable, the model is estimated for profitability measures 
for 1995 through 2015, a 21-year period. 
If an observation on an institution was missing any of the variables, I excluded it 
from the analysis. I removed observations in which institutions reported extreme values 
(below the first percentile and above the 99th percentile for the entire time period) of pre-tax 
ROA, NPL, EFF, ROE, or equity capital ratio from the data set. This reduces the influence 
of outliers and eliminates some nonsensical observations that appear in this large data set. 
After this Winsorization of the data, I removed observations on institutions with asset or 
liability ratios greater than one or less than zero, assuming they contained errors or reflected 
extraordinary circumstances. It was also necessary to drop institutions which appear in the 
data only once in order to perform fixed effects estimation, which requires at least two 
observations for each cross-sectional unit. Finally, I excluded branches of foreign institutions 
that appear in the FDIC data sets.  
 
[Table 2 Here] 
 
The resulting data set has 188,801 observations on 14,211 institutions. (The 
numbers of observations used to estimate the regression models is smaller due to the use of 
lagged independent variables.) Because thousands of institutions obtained charters, closed, 
failed, were acquired, or merged during the time period studied, the panel is not balanced. 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 present summary statistics for, respectively, all of the institutions in the 
sample, commercial banks only, and thrifts only. They include observations that survived 
the outlier and error detection process described above. The means are unweighted, while 
the ROAPTX, NPL, and EFF data presented in Figures 1-3 are aggregate values, explaining 
apparent inconsistencies between the two. Institutions with thrift charters are about 15.2 % 
of the sample. Thrifts tend less towards holding securities and more towards lending than 
commercial banks. For thrifts, 21.2% and 66.4% of assets are in securities and loans, 
respectively, compared to 25.4% and 60.6% for banks. Thrift lending is dominated by 
residential real estate loans (RRE), which make up 45.8% of the average thrifts’ total assets. 
None of the other lending categories comprise more than 10% of thrift’s assets. The average 
commercial bank in the sample, on the other hand, has a more even distribution of lending, 
 with RRE also the leading type, but at only 16.6% of total assets and with commercial real 
estate lending (CRE) comprising 13.0% of total assets. Mutual ownership is much more 
common for thrifts than commercial banks (48.3% versus 0.1%). Such differences may help 
explain differences in profitability over time, independent of the regulatory regime. 
 
[Table 3 Here] 
 
[Table 4 Here] 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Results of the regression model estimates are presented in Tables 5-7. In support of H1, 
tested by estimation of Equation (1) above, the Dodd-Frank Act is associated with lower pre-
tax ROA (ROAPTX). The coefficient on the DF variable is negative and significant (-0.048, 
t = -10.666) when the model is estimated on all of the data (Table 5, column 1). ROAPTX is 
a percentage, so this can be interpreted as an estimated decrease in pre-tax ROA during the 
Dodd-Frank Era of 4.8 basis points, after controlling for other confounding factors. It may 
also be interpreted is as an expected loss of 4.8 cents per hundred dollars of total assets. 
Thrift profitability, however, has not suffered as commercial banks have during the Dodd-
Frank era. The coefficient on the THRIFT×DF term is positive and significant (0.091, t = 
10.407). In fact, the sum of the coefficients (-0.048+0.091 = 0.043) indicates that thrifts, 
ceteris paribus, have improved profitability by 4.3 cents per hundred dollars since the Dodd-
Frank Act became law.  
 
[Table 5 Here] 
 
Though thrifts’ and banks’ aggregate pre-tax profits are lower than they were before 
the act was passed (Figure 1), other factors, such as slow economic growth (average 
unemployment in the institutions’ primary counties before 2011 was 5.4% and 6.8% after) 
also appear to be driving the decline in profitability during this time period. The coefficient 
on CO_UNEMP is similar in magnitude (-0.044, t = -61.127) to the coefficient on DF. 
Ownership structure also appears to play a more important role in profitability than the Dodd-
Frank regulations. Thrifts are much more likely to be organized under mutual ownership than 
stock ownership (48.3% of the sample for thrifts versus 0.1% for commercial banks). As 
Figure 4 shows, mutual ownership is associated with lower profitability. With the exception 
of the subprime mortgage crisis period, thrifts that are mutually owned consistently earn 
lower profits than those that are owned by stockholders. In the regression, the coefficient on 
MUTUAL, significant at the 1% level, is -0.119, much larger than the coefficient on DF.  The 
coefficient on THRIFT is not significantly different from zero, indicating that outside the 
Dodd-Frank era, thrifts didn’t enjoy a pre-tax profitability advantage or disadvantage. 
 
[Figure 4 Here] 
 
I estimated the model on five subsets of the data to examine whether the results are 
robust to several other considerations. Because HHI and CO_UNEMP may not measure local 
competitive and economic conditions well for multi-market banks, I estimated the model on 
observations only on institutions with deposits in one county (Table 5, Column 2). The 
 results were qualitatively the same – a negative coefficient on DF (-0.071, t = -11.615), a 
larger positive coefficient on THRIFTxDF (0.111, t = 9.048), and a non-significant 
coefficient on THRIFT. The signs and significance on the other coefficients remained the 
same, too. A sub-set of the sample that included only institutions classified by the FDIC as 
community banks (column 3) also exhibits the same pattern. (The FDIC designates both 
banks and thrifts as “community banks” if they meet long list of criteria, including assets less 
than $1 billion in 2015 dollars, loan-to-asset ratios above 33%, core deposit ratios above 
50%, foreign assets below 10%, or less than 50% of assets in areas not commonly considered 
community-oriented such as credit card lending, trust management, and industrial loan 
companies (FDIC, 2012). I also created subsets of the institutions according to size, using 
real assets corresponding to $1 billion in 2015 dollars as the upper limit for “small” 
institutions (column 4), $1 billion to $10 billion in 2015 dollars for “medium” institutions 
(column 5), and the rest classified as large institutions (column 6). The coefficients for small 
institutions show the same pattern as those for the entire sample,  The coefficient for large 
and medium institutions, however, do not, with none of the coefficients on the three variables 
of interest (DF, THRIFT×DF, and THRIFT) significant for medium banks, and THRIFT 
being negative for large institutions. The insignificance of the THRIFT×DF coefficient on 
the medium and large institution sub-samples tells us that the improvement in thrift 
profitability has been concentrated among small, community-oriented thrifts. Although these 
thrifts may operate under stricter or less-understanding supervision now, given all the other 
factors that play a role in profitability, they are doing relatively well. Perhaps because their 
regulator no longer allows them to pursue high-risk, high-reward strategies, medium and 
large thrifts are not experiencing the same type of improvement.  
I turn now to the results of the non-performing loan (NPL) model (Equation (2) 
above). For the entire sample, depository institutions on average held fewer defaulted loans 
on their books in the Dodd-Frank era than in other eras, after controlling for the composition 
of assets and liabilities, various institutional characteristics, and market conditions (Table 6, 
column 1). The coefficient on DF is negative and significant (-0.076, t = -29.731), holding 
constant. The average institution in the Dodd-Frank era saw a 7.6-basis-point (7.6 cents for 
every hundred dollars of total assets) reduction in its percentage of bad loans, ceteris paribus.  
 
[Table 6 Here] 
 
Thrifts, however, exhibited greater non-performing loan ratios than commercial 
banks after the Dodd-Frank Act became law, consistent with the univariate data presented in 
Figure 2. The coefficient on THRIFT×DF (column 1) is positive and significant (0.018, t = 
3.543). For medium thrifts (column 5), the magnitude of the THRIFT×DF coefficient is 
greater than that of the DF coefficient. The finding indicates that, despite noteworthy failures 
of regulation of large thrifts, the OTS may have adequately supervised small and medium 
thrifts before it was eliminated. Bolstering this conclusion are the results from estimating the 
model for the subsample of large institutions only (column 6). For that subsample, the 
THRIFT×DF coefficient is negative and significant (-0.091, t = -2.514), consistent with an 
improvement in loan quality for large thrifts during this period. For the subsamples of FDIC-
classified community banks and small institutions, the coefficient on THRIFT×DF is 
positive and significant. For the subsample of institutions that operate in one county only 
(column 2), the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. With the exception of the 
subsample of large institutions, the coefficient on THRIFT is not significantly different from 
 zero for any of the subsets, indicating that on average thrifts did not have greater proportions 
of non-performing loans over the period from 1992 until the crisis began in 2007. For large 
institutions (column 6), however, there is a positive and statistically significant thrift effect 
(0.107, t = 2.119). At 10.7 basis points, or 10.7 cents for every $100 in assets, this is a greater 
magnitude than the Dodd-Frank era effect for the sample as a whole. This, too, is consistent 
with the narrative that the OTS less effectively regulated large thrifts than small and mid-
sized thrifts.  
 
[Table 7 Here] 
 
Finally, I examine the results of the efficiency ratio (EFF) regression. Recall that a 
lower efficiency ratio is desirable, because it indicates overhead costs are smaller relative to 
operating income. My hypotheses (H5 and H6) are that efficiency decreased for all 
depository institutions after the Dodd-Frank Act, while thrifts’ efficiency decreased more 
than those of commercial banks. Table 7, column 1 shows that, for the entire sample, the 
regression model supports both hypotheses.  The coefficient on DF is positive and significant 
(9.446, t = 94.447) while the coefficient on THRIFT×DF is smaller, but still positive and 
significant (2.139, t = 10.666). For the average institution the sample, the Dodd-Frank period 
is associated with a 9.446 percentage point increase in non-interest expenses as a fraction of 
operating revenues ($9.45 for every $100). For the average thrift, the period is associated 
with 11.585 (9.446+2.139) percentage point increase ($11.59 for every $100). The 
coefficient on THRIFT is not significantly different from zero. Qualitatively, the results for 
the efficiency ratio regression hold for community bank, small, and medium subsamples 
(columns 2-4). For the subsample of medium institutions, which retains the positive and 
significant coefficient on DF, but the coefficient on THRIFT×DF is not significantly 
different from zero, while for the large subsample, the THRIFT×DF coefficient is negative 
and significant (-8.421 and t = -4.333). Efficiency ratios can include a variety of expenses in 
the numerator, some of which are not regulatory. The results, however, are consistent with 
greater regulatory costs, and those costs falling particularly heavily on smaller institutions. 
The magnitude of the change in efficiency ratio is far greater than the changes in pre-tax 
return on assets and non-performing loans. This implies that these changes in expenses, some 
of which are likely tied to regulation, are being offset by cost reductions in other areas.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper I examine evidence from financial statements submitted to regulators by U.S. 
thrifts and banks over the past 25 years to assess whether the Dodd-Frank act is associated 
with a decline in performance for depository institutions as a group, and whether the act has 
had a disproportionate impact on thrifts specifically. Using fixed-effects regression analysis 
to control for other confounding factors, I find that pre-tax ROA has fallen for depository 
institutions on the whole, but the reduction has been borne by commercial banks while small 
thrifts have seen an improvement in profitability after controlling for other factors. The 
results of the analysis provide evidence that slow economic growth is playing a comparable 
role to that of other changes in the Dodd-Frank period. They also provide evidence that 
mutual ownership, rather than stock ownership, strongly contributes to the pattern over the 
last two decades of thrifts earning lower pre-tax profits than commercial banks.  
  With respect to depository institution risk, my analysis also indicates that the change 
in regulation of thrifts directed by the Dodd-Frank Act is associated with lower rates of 
default on loans made by most types of institutions, including large thrifts. For small thrifts, 
the effect is not as great as it is for the average institution. For medium thrifts, it appears 
there has been a small uptick in loan default after controlling for other confounding factors. 
For large thrifts, there was an increase in non-performing loans, but it was less than the 
increase for commercial banks. All of this suggests that, before it was shut down, the OTS 
adequately supervised small thrifts before it was shut down in the wake of its embarrassing 
performance with large thrifts.  
 My analysis also examines depository institution non-interest expense, as measured 
by the efficiency ratio, over the time period examined. After controlling for other possible 
confounding factors, the Dodd-Frank era has seen a significant increase in efficiency ratios 
of all depository institutions, with thrifts experiencing a larger increase. Non-interest expense 
may include a variety of charges, one of which is the cost of regulatory compliance. Though 
not conclusive, this result provides some evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act increased 
compliance costs for U.S. depository institutions, with the burden falling particularly heavily 
on thrifts.  
 Taken as a whole, the results suggest that, the Dodd-Frank era has produced higher 
regulator costs, lower profitability, but lower risk for U.S. depository institutions. Lower risk 
is going hand-in-hand with lower return, suggesting that policy makers’ level of risk aversion 
should guild their assessments of the new law. The problem of relatively lax regulation of 
large thrifts seems to have been reined in. The evidence from this analysis is that the change 
in supervision of small thrifts has corresponded with an increase in both their risk and 
profitability relative to commercial banks. Much of the remaining difference between the 
two in pre-tax profitability can be attributed to the widespread mutual ownership of thrifts.   
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 FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
This chart shows the quarterly aggregate pre-tax return on equity (ROE) for U.S. 
banks and thrifts between 1992Q4: and 2015:Q3. The vertical line is placed at 
2010:Q3, when the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law. 
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Figure 1: Aggregate Pre-tax ROA
U.S. Banks and Thrifts: 1992-2015
Banks Thrifts
Dodd-Frank 
  
This chart shows the quarterly aggregate ratio of non-performing loans to total assets 
(NPL) for U.S. banks and thrifts between 1992Q4: and 2015:Q3. The vertical line is 
placed at 2010:Q3, when the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law. 
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Figure 2: Aggregate NPL Ratios: 
U.S. Banks and Thrifts 1992-2015
Banks Thrifts
Dodd-Frank 
Act
  
This chart shows the quarterly aggregate efficiency ratios for U.S. banks and thrifts 
between 1992Q4: and 2015:Q3. The efficiency ratio is the non-interest expense less 
depreciation on intangible assets divided by the sum of non-interest expense and net 
interest margin. A lower efficiency ratio means the institution overhead expenses 
are a smaller fraction of operating revenues and, hence, a lower efficiency ratio is 
more desirable. A single observation on a thrift in 2008:Q4 was eliminated because 
it resulted in an efficiency ratio of more than 1700% for thrifts in that period. The 
vertical line is placed at 2010:Q3, when the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law. 
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Figure 3: Aggregate Efficiency Ratios
U.S. Banks and Thrifts: 1992-2015
Banks Thrifts
Dodd-Frank 
  
This chart shows the quarterly aggregate pre-tax return on equity (ROE) for U.S. 
thrifts, categorized as stock or mutual ownership, between 1992Q4: and 2015:Q3. The 
vertical line is placed at 2010:Q3, when the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law. 
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Figure 4: Aggregate Pre-tax ROA
U.S. Stock and Mutual Thrifts: 1992-2015
Stock Mutual
Dodd-Frank 
 Table 1: U.S. Commercial Bank and Thrift Comparison 
Category 
Commercial 
Banks 
Thrifts 
1992 Charters 11,463 2,472 
1992 Percent of all DI Charters 82.3 17.7 
2015 Charters 5,447 823 
2015 Percent of all DI Charters 86.9 13.1 
1992 Total Assets ($billions) 3,431 1,066 
1992 Percent of all DI Total Assets 76.3 23.7 
2015 Total Assets ($billions) 14,632 1,031 
2015 Percent of all DI Total Assets 93.4 6.6 
*This table shows changes over time in the number and charters and value of total assets of 
commercial bank and thrifts in the U.S. from 1992 to 2015. Data come from the FDIC’s 
December 2015 Statistics at a Glance. 
  
 Table 2: Summary statistics on all institutions in the sample: 1992-2015 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROAPTX 1.297 1.372 0.942 -5.066 4.564 
NPL 0.163 0.026 0.304 0 2.087 
EFF 67.483 65.400 17.368 25.216 197.847 
DF 0.173 0 0.379 0 1 
THRIFT 0.152 0 0.359 0 1 
THRIFTxDF 0.024 0 0.152 0 1 
ASSETS      521,808     56,123    9,567,187  
                 
570 
   
844,672,512  
SECURITIES 24.716 22.731 15.467 0 99.218 
LOANS 61.527 63.331 15.586 0 99.027 
CI 8.742 7.233 7.343 0 89.871 
CONSUMER 6.090 4.324 6.935 0 99.947 
CRE 12.252 9.752 10.332 0 85.710 
CLD 4.019 1.884 5.916 0 81.681 
RRE 21.061 17.165 16.074 0 96.976 
BROKERED 1.562 0 5.172 0 91.265 
NON-CORE 16.987 14.700 11.534 0 93.838 
MUTUAL 0.074 0 0.262 0 1 
STATE 0.704 1 0.457 0 1 
HHI 2104 1754 1344 336 10,000 
UNEMP 5.7 5.2 2.4 0.7 38.1 
YEAR 2003.31 2003 6.29 1994 2015 
CRISIS 0.204 0 0.403 0 1 
No. Obs. 188,801     
The above table presents summary statistics on the data used in the analysis. Data presented 
here relate to both commercial banks and thrifts. Data sources and construction are 
described in more detail in the “Data” section in the main body of the text.  
 
  
 Table 3: Summary statistics on commercial banks: 1992-2015 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROAPTX 1.350 1.435 0.948 -5.066 4.557 
NPL 0.168 0.032 0.305 0 2.085 
EFF 66.781 64.736 16.849 25.216 197.368 
DF 0.177 0 0.381 0 1 
THRIFT 0 0 0 0 0 
THRIFTxDF 0 0 0 0 0 
ASSETS      536,077   52,165  10,309,797     570 844,672,512 
SECURITIES 25.351 23.425 15.191 0 98.490 
LOANS 60.657 62.454 15.238 0 98.268 
CI 9.843 8.210 7.262 0 89.871 
CONSUMER 6.543 4.810 7.011 0 99.623 
CRE 13.001 10.566 10.585 0 85.710 
CLD 4.063 1.896 5.929 0 81.681 
RRE 16.628 15.012 10.849 0 94.433 
BROKERED 1.630 0 5.206 0 90.942 
NON-CORE 16.406 14.340 11.004 0 93.838 
MUTUAL 0.001 0 0.027 0 1 
STATE 0.750 1 0.433 0 1 
HHI 2185 1813 1395 336   10,000 
UNEMP 5.648 5.100 2.464 0.700 38.100 
YEAR 2003.39 2003 6.299 1994 2015 
CRISIS 0.206 0 0.404 0 1 
No. Obs.  160,062      
The above table presents summary statistics on the data used in the analysis. Data 
presented here relate to commercial banks only, not thrifts. Data sources and construction 
are described in more detail in the “Data” section in the main body of the text. 
 
  
 Table 4: Summary statistics for thrifts in the sample: 1992-2015 
Label Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROAPTX 1.002 1.025 0.851 -4.990 4.564 
NPL 0.136 0 0.292 0 2.087 
EFF 71.394 69.709 19.559 25.368 197.847 
DF 0.155 0 0.362 0 1 
THRIFT 1 1 0 1 1 
THRIFTxDF 0.155 0 0.362 0 1 
ASSETS 442,339 89,343 3,051,849 803 173,880,169 
SECURITIES 21.180 18.270 16.484 0 99.218 
LOANS 66.373 68.995 16.583 0 99.027 
CI 2.613 0.887 4.023 0 51.700 
CONSUMER 3.567 1.473 5.892 0 99.947 
CRE 8.076 5.927 7.529 0 58.556 
CLD 3.769 1.834 5.832 0 73.583 
RRE 45.753 46.379 17.966 0 96.976 
BROKERED 1.187 0 4.963 0 91.265 
NON-CORE 20.220 17.243 13.684 0.008 91.776 
MUTUAL 0.483 0 0.500 0 1 
STATE 0.444 0 0.497 0 1 
HHI 1657.010 1469.060 894.467 335.811 8993.620 
UNEMP 5.735 5.300 2.212 1.100 24.700 
YEAR 2002.88 2002 6.213 1994 2015 
CRISIS 0.194 0 0.395 0 1 
No. Obs.  28,739     
The above table presents summary statistics on the data used in the analysis. Data 
presented here relate to thrifts only, not commercial banks. Data sources and construction 
are described in more detail in the “Data” section in the main body of the text.  
 
  
 Table 5: Pre-tax return on assets regression model results  
 
All 
(1) 
One 
County 
(2) 
Community 
(3) 
Small 
(4) 
Medium 
(5) 
Large 
(6) 
DF  -0.048*** -0.071*** -0.056*** -0.051*** 0.030 -0.034 
 (-10.666) (-11.615) (-12.389) (-11.097) (0.887) (-0.498) 
THRIFT×DF 0.091*** 0.111*** 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.021 0.111 
 (10.407) (9.048) (11.653) (10.307) (0.431) (0.920) 
THRIFT -0.013 -0.030 0.001 0.011 -0.068 -0.305* 
 (-0.800) (-1.089) (0.084) (0.644) (-0.782) (-1.828) 
LN_SIZE -0.153*** -0.216*** -0.151*** -0.163*** -0.218*** -0.113*** 
 (-42.038) (-31.785) (-36.593) (-38.945) (-7.545) (-2.821) 
SECURITIES 0.000* 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.003* 0.000 
 (1.949) (5.569) (2.897) (2.733) (-1.795) (-0.048) 
LOANS 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003 -0.007 
 (5.560) (4.979) (5.400) (5.875) (-1.050) (-1.330) 
CI -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.008 
 (-2.429) (-3.991) (-3.041) (-3.013) (0.283) (1.204) 
CONSUMER -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001 0.010* 
 (-7.703) (-3.429) (-6.793) (-7.825) (-0.392) (1.775) 
CRE 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.010*** -0.006 
 (1.703) (2.682) (1.777) (1.866) (3.275) (-0.709) 
CLD -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.023*** -0.035*** 
 (-20.844) (-8.732) (-18.511) (-17.925) (-7.154) (-3.635) 
RRE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.779) (1.045) (0.980) (0.660) (1.890) (0.806) 
BROKERED -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (-16.075) (-7.115) (-14.413) (-14.113) (-4.699) (-3.067) 
NON-CORE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.002** 0.005*** 
 (-15.487) (-12.509) (-19.040) (-18.500) (2.072) (3.011) 
NPL -0.080*** -0.067*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.139*** -0.131 
 (-18.298) (-12.574) (-18.314) (-18.435) (-3.102) (-1.638) 
EFF -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.040*** 
 (-404.045) (-298.381) (-405.141) (-406.912) (-55.893) (-26.686) 
MUTUAL -0.119*** -0.147*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.215*** -0.070 
 (-9.683) (-8.292) (-9.907) (-9.281) (-3.277) (-0.158) 
STATE -0.006 -0.032** 0.004 -0.001 -0.072 -0.276** 
 (-0.681) (-2.385) (0.496) (-0.118) (-1.561) (-2.324) 
HHI 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.306) (1.924) (2.947) (1.596) (0.663) (-2.342) 
CO_UNEMP -0.044*** -0.031*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.115*** -0.096*** 
 (-61.127) (-31.641) (-55.478) (-55.492) (-25.113) (-9.986) 
CRISIS -0.112*** -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.204*** -0.373*** 
 (-21.988) (-14.547) (-19.120) (-19.076) (-5.783) (-5.347) 
RRE×CRISIS 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 -0.002 
 (10.240) (6.641) (11.957) (11.328) (-0.407) (-0.751) 
Observations 170,888 94,423 155,714 160,925 7,945 2,018 
 Institutions 14,211 10,811 12,769 13,628 1,338 305 
Adjusted R2 0.757 0.783 0.772 0.771 0.658 0.620 
F-statistic 38.565*** 34.021*** 43.019*** 41.077*** 12.657*** 11.230*** 
This table presents the results of a regression model that estimates the relationship between pre-tax 
return on assets (ROAPTX) on three variables of interest and a set of control variables. The variables 
of interest, in bold-face, are DF (a binary variable that equals one if the observation is in 2011 or 
later), THRIFT×DF (an interaction term that equals one if the observation is on a thrift in 2011 or 
later), and THRIFT (a binary variable that equals one if the observation is on a thrift at any time). 
The control variables are described in the text. 
***, **, and *, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
  
 Table 6: Regressions results with non-performing loans as dependent 
variable 
 
All 
(1) 
One 
County 
(2) 
Community 
(3) 
Small 
(4) 
Medium 
(5) 
Large 
(6) 
DF  -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.025*** 0.083*** 
 (-29.731) (-18.842) (-27.195) (-27.536) (-2.845) (4.122) 
THRIFT×DF 0.018*** 0.010 0.017*** 0.013** 0.035*** -0.091** 
 (3.543) (1.231) (3.254) (2.431) (2.863) (-2.514) 
THRIFT -0.003 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.107** 
 (-0.276) (0.402) (0.790) (0.597) (0.254) (2.119) 
LN_SIZE -0.004* -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 0.026*** 0.090*** 
 (-1.696) (-2.817) (-7.791) (-7.434) (3.461) (7.479) 
LOANS 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 
 (18.033) (13.457) (18.985) (18.200) (-0.1456) (-0.166) 
CI -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.001* -0.001 
 (-6.299) (-3.435) (-6.367) (-6.085) (1.712) (-0.447) 
CONSUMER 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (11.733) (8.095) (7.790) (10.648) (5.647) (3.689) 
CRE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.005** 
 (-10.922) (-6.512) (-10.613) (-9.965) (0.255) (2.055) 
CLD -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001 0.000 
 (-3.808) (-2.816) (-3.254) (-2.456) (-0.917) (0.002) 
RRE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.003* 
 (-7.870) (-5.146) (-8.900) (-8.157) (1.454) (1.883) 
BROKERED 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001 
 (1.859) (0.439) (1.328) (1.266) (1.720) (0.618) 
NON-CORE 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
 (-2.156) (-1.984) (0.428) (0.553) (-4.886) (0.351) 
EFF -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-15.041) (-12.090) (-15.591) (-15.793) (-0.257) (0.457) 
MUTUAL 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.017 0.019 
 (5.350) (3.870) (4.818) (4.911) (0.981) (0.144) 
STATE 0.000 -0.016* 0.001 0.003 0.030** -0.093*** 
 (-0.044) (-1.784) (0.094) (0.472) (2.558) (-2.613) 
HHI 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (2.570) (-1.026) (0.924) (1.116) (-1.158) (3.474) 
CO_UNEMP 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.034*** 
 (19.294) (12.353) (17.106) (17.538) (8.264) (11.768) 
CRISIS -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.029*** 0.000 0.028 
 (-9.806) (-6.704) (-9.998) (-9.497) (0.043) (1.305) 
RRE×CRISIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.497) (1.640) (1.605) (1.110) (0.137) (0.541) 
Observations 170,888 94,423 155,714 160,925 7,945 2,018 
Institutions 14,211 10,811 12,769 13,628 1,338 305 
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.307 0.290 0.291 0.473 0.586 
 F-statistic 6.018*** 5.040*** 6.059*** 5.868*** 6.445*** 9.929*** 
This table presents the results of a regression model that estimates the relationship between the ratio 
of non-performing loan to total assets (NPL) on three variables of interest and a set of control 
variables. The variables of interest, in bold-face, are DF (a binary variable that equals one if the 
observation is in 2011 or later), THRIFT×DF (an interaction term that equals one if the observation 
is on a thrift in 2011 or later), and THRIFT (a binary variable that equals one if the observation is 
on a thrift at any time). The control variables are described in the text. 
***, **, and *, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
 Table 7: Regression results with efficiency ratio as dependent variable 
 
All 
(1) 
One 
County 
(2) 
Community 
(3) 
Small 
(4) 
Medium 
(5) 
Large 
(6) 
DF  9.446*** 10.144*** 9.804*** 9.787*** 8.213*** 9.149*** 
 (94.447) (74.034) (94.164) (94.348) (15.505) (8.400) 
THRIFT×DF 2.139*** 2.927*** 2.269*** 2.290*** -0.534 -8.421*** 
 (10.666) (10.269) (11.162) (10.914) (-0.692) (-4.333) 
THRIFT -0.053 -0.276 -0.077 0.565 1.854 -3.767 
 (-0.142) (-0.430) (-0.191) (1.393) (1.317) (-1.394) 
LN_SIZE -6.052*** -10.997*** -6.929*** -7.185*** -2.945*** -1.932*** 
 (-73.238) (-71.239) (-71.212) (-73.655) (-6.347) (-2.997) 
SECURITIES -0.324*** -0.285*** -0.333*** -0.322*** -0.282*** -0.243*** 
 (-63.195) (-44.234) (-61.593) (-61.107) (-11.074) (-4.873) 
LOANS -0.501*** -0.455*** -0.520*** -0.505*** -0.400*** 0.071 
 (-63.450) (-43.273) (-63.179) (-62.351) (-9.305) (0.828) 
CI 0.091*** 0.109*** 0.088*** 0.096*** 0.072 -0.345*** 
 (9.874) (8.362) (9.167) (10.043) (1.477) (-3.297) 
CONSUMER 0.012 0.007 -0.004 -0.006 0.123** -0.479*** 
 (1.158) (0.470) (-0.3512) (-0.567) (2.406) (-5.294) 
CRE 0.158*** 0.170*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.102** -0.161 
 (18.562) (13.851) (20.396) (20.329) (2.068) (-1.235) 
CLD 0.215*** 0.267*** 0.244*** 0.249*** -0.033 -0.105 
 (20.836) (17.601) (22.572) (23.280) (-0.630) (-0.673) 
RRE 0.128*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.178*** -0.305*** 
 (16.354) (10.474) (15.167) (15.456) (4.367) (-3.643) 
BROKERED -0.017** -0.031*** -0.023** -0.016* 0.061* -0.076* 
 (-2.040) (-2.662) (-2.460) (-1.752) (1.960) (-1.726) 
NON-CORE 0.115*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.133*** 0.009 0.079*** 
 (26.436) (23.348) (31.060) (28.762) (0.564) (2.702) 
NPL -0.211** 0.653*** 0.894*** 0.890*** 3.120*** 1.241 
 (-2.098) (5.258) (8.862) (8.803) (4.338) (0.972) 
MUTUAL -3.642*** -4.300*** -3.430*** -3.801*** -2.699** -24.064*** 
 (-12.847) (-10.373) (-12.069) (-12.840) (-2.551) (-3.371) 
STATE -1.512*** -1.829*** -0.965*** -1.239*** -1.882** 0.801 
 (-7.596) (-5.790) (-4.495) (-5.865) (-2.526) (0.417) 
HHI 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-3.738) (-0.721) (-3.640) (-5.193) (-0.082) (-0.096) 
CRISIS 4.759*** 4.609*** 4.725*** 4.749*** 4.632*** 3.681*** 
 (41.046) (30.330) (39.451) (39.863) (8.177) (3.282) 
RRE×CRISIS 0.096*** 0.114*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.028 -0.057* 
 (23.734) (21.418) (24.336) (24.296) (1.448) (-1.714) 
Observations 170,888 94,423 155,714 160,925 7,945 2,018 
Institutions 14,211 10,811 12,769 13,628 1,338 305 
Adjusted R2 0.610 0.661 0.617 0.616 0.600 0.510 
F-statistic 19.823*** 18.784*** 20.942*** 20.047*** 10.115*** 7.564*** 
 This table presents the results of a regression model that estimates the relationship between 
institutions’ efficiency ratio (EFF) on three variables of interest and a set of control variables. The 
variables of interest, in bold-face, are DF (a binary variable that equals one if the observation is in 
2011 or later), THRIFT×DF (an interaction term that equals one if the observation is on a thrift in 
2011 or later), and THRIFT (a binary variable that equals one if the observation is on a thrift at any 
time). The control variables are described in the text. 
***, **, and *, denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
